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
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Kevin N. Lewis

April 1984

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## COMBINED OPERATIONS IN MODERN NAVAL WARFARE: MARITIME STRATEGY AND INTERSERVICE COOPERATION

Kevin N. Lewis

The Rand Corporation, Washington D.C.

April 1984

It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of the different arms which will insure victory.

- Jomini

### INTRODUCTION

Few aspects of military behavior are more execrated than the failure of sister services (and often the failure of different branches or combat arms within a uniformed service) to get together their joint act and put a reliable defense on line at the most reasonable price. The stereotypical model of interminable interservice rivalry leads many to the conclusion that the aim of deterrence or defeat of hostile military powers runs a distant second to the twin objectives of prevailing in the annual Battle of the Budget and assuring operational autonomy.

This popular image seems to have some basis in fact, as a brief *tour d'horizon* paints a depressing picture indeed. A number of joint development programs, including the Light Armored Vehicle, JVX tilt-rotor aircraft, and JTACMS missile, have apparently collapsed in the wake of squabbling over specifications and requirements. Arrangements linking together command and operational entities seem equally hapless. We have lately been regaled, for instance, with accounts of ill-advised Hq EUCOM involvement in the planning of the bombing raid over Lebanon in which two aircraft were lost, and of bungling due to turf fights over

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which service should do what in the Grenada incursion. Meanwhile, many critics contend that the services procure duplicative equipment and even prepare for identical missions, while important needs of other kinds are not met. The list goes on.

True, there has lately been a smattering of evidence of *productive* interservice initiatives: the Fleetex-83 exercise, the Summer 1982 Watkins-Gabriel Memorandum of Agreement approving efforts to expand the scope of Air Force-Navy collaboration in training operations, the Spring 1984 Wickham-Gabriel MOA to enhance Air Force-Army cooperation, the joint TAC-TRADOC effort on Joint Second Echelon Attack doctrine, and substantial cooperation on tactical air-launched missile, jet engine, and other programs. But on balance, it is generally agreed that our joint service performance record is not one in which we can have much pride.

Despite widespread condemnation of the joint service record, most public critics fail to follow up on their reportage with constructive remedies. If any guidelines for improvement *are* tendered, they tend to take the form of vague calls for sweeping organizational reform, the adoption of magical new strategies, the tethering of malevolent military-industrial complexes, and the like. Moreover, with a few exceptions, most official proponents of practical interservice coordination initiatives concentrate on the day-to-day specifics of the operational or acquisition problem at hand. Such a narrow technical focus is, of course, necessary, but it does not illuminate the path to broad systemic reform.

It may turn out that fundamental refinements of key aspects of our defense planning process simply are *not* possible at all--but a convincing case to this or any other end has not yet been made. We all suspect that we can do better, but how much better? Will improvements come forever on the margin--on a program by program, battle by battle, and plan by plan basis? Or can sound methods be derived to assure more predictable success in interservice endeavors in war and peace alike?

This paper will explore the prospects for better interservice coordination from a fairly broad vantage point. The aim is to characterize the present situation and suggest some general planning themes which might yield some improved joint initiative outcomes. The

focus of the discussion is on the Department of the Navy, and its interactions with the rest of the U.S. military system. As we shall see, there is a unique Navy planning style (in both PPBS and operations planning) that in effect places that service somewhat outside of what one might call a joint planning mainstream. In my view, this dissimilarity will always bound the degree to which the joint service agenda can be made more fruitful.

To the extent possible, my emphasis will be on interservice possibilities in the potential modern *wartime* context. However, keep in mind that it is unwise to restrict our attention solely to the strategic and operational issues encountered once the balloon has gone up. The urgent need to *deter* war; the prospect that war may begin on short or no notice; the need to deal with allies and friends on a routine basis; and, increasingly, the emergence of a gray area of international violence between clear-cut peace and clear-cut hostilities--these and other issues counsel against any exclusion of the various *peacetime* planning controversies that normally arise among the services.

Even if we decided to concentrate only on wartime issues, we would find that it is probably impossible to completely unlink the destinies of the different armed services. For many reasons, there will be several participants in any combat action or in the implementation of new national strategy or force posture policy. One primary reason for this, naturally, is the universal desire to demonstrate the relevance of one's service or branch when it comes to supporting national aims (and, accordingly, to endorse one's claims to sufficient representation in the defense budget). For example, when SAC's nuclear firepower was formally selected as the bulwark of America's defense shortly after World War II, the other services (and even the USAF's tactical commands) rushed to get a piece of the nuclear action. We have seen just the same process in conventional combat situations from Korea to Grenada.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> If a war involving only operations beneath the polar icepack were to begin, we shouldn't be surprised to see ingenious justifications from every angle arguing for a piece of the action. But keep in mind the fact that the desire to be involved is neither a U.S., nor a modern phenomenon. It is, though, more likely to be found among newly constituted services or service branches. In the 1920's, for instance, the newly formed RAF sought to demonstrate the relevance of air power in the furtherance of Britain's imperial interests by, among other things,

Therefore, this paper will necessarily include some consideration of service interactions other than ones relating directly to maritime operations. This must be so since even if the potential areas for wartime cooperation in some conflict are few and far between,<sup>2</sup> it is still the case that *every single dimension* of our capabilities and plans for fighting and winning in maritime conflicts will be determined by high level decisions about the allocation of scarce resources *that may have virtually nothing to do with the specific characteristics of the potential naval warfare problems before us, with naval-related technological possibilities, with the nature of the maritime threat, etc.* Like it or not, then, we simply cannot separate the problem of "combined operations in modern naval warfare" from the broader matrix of our total defense budget preparation process.

In short, when it comes to interservice cooperation--or rather the lack of same--money is the root of evil. No reasonable observer really thinks that "600 ships" are not strategically desirable--or twenty-five Army divisions, or sixty tactical USAF wings either, for that matter. If the JCS' "high-confidence" force structure objective (as laid out in the JSPD) was somehow available at a bargain basement price, we would certainly take it in all its parts and interservice rivalry would be largely a memory. But pending any such miracle, we must try wherever possible to improve on our historical joint performance record.<sup>3</sup>

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bombing Iraqi and other rebels in the 1920s. A similar pattern is evident in the rise of the German Navy in the 1890s. Only in those circumstances where there is an undeniable, unambiguous military problem, few options for solving it, and much tradition, will the usual bureaucratic phenomena be absent: the historic preeminence in Soviet military history of, variously, the Red Army and the Strategic Rocket Forces fall into this category.

<sup>2</sup> Note that the Vietnam war, for the most part, could have been fought in such a way that almost no part of it could have been considered to be a "naval" conflict. Nonetheless, Navy forces of all kinds did play a major role there. The reverse applies as well: even in essentially maritime contingencies as Grenada or the Falklands we will see everyone involved. (The RAF, for instance, went to great lengths to bomb Stanley airfield with jury rigged Vulcan bombers.)

<sup>3</sup> The JCS agree annually on a Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD, formerly the JSOP), which is literally a cobbling together of all the services' best case force structure wish lists. The JSPD



It is useful to divide this enormously complex issue into three categories:

- 1 *Strategic issues*: What relative priorities should be attached to which undertakings? What is the connection between a proposed military capability and our national objectives?
- 2 *Operational issues*: Is the allocation of authority over combat capabilities appropriate? Are diverse forces working effectively toward a unified purpose in their preparations for, or actual conduct of, a military contingency?
- 3 *Efficiency issues*: Is there inefficient overlap as services prepare for the same mission? For example, are two production lines serving different services when one would suffice?

All are, of course, important, but to reduce this topic into something of manageable proportions, this paper will concentrate on the second and third points.

Before proceeding, note that the term "combined operations (or arms)" has been widely used in connection with debates over how to forge the best linkage among different organizations as they ponder the opportunities for collaboration in strategic concepts, in operational arrangements, and for the sake of efficiency. Throughout this paper, I will use the terms "interservice" and "combined" interchangeably. Indeed the former may be slightly more accurate in so far as the Navy demonstrably has no problem with combined arms. After all, the Department of the Navy, in addition to its surface and submarine forces, maintains its own army, three active air forces, a strategic force, and a space command. In wartime, the Navy would absorb the Reserves of two services, not to mention the "fifth U.S. service," the Coast Guard. So, the point of greatest interest is how this diversified enterprise would interact with other players who maintain all of these force structure elements (save sea-going vessels).

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construction process is completely undisciplined by any budgetary constraint, nor are the Chiefs institutionally able or willing to make difficult priority decisions when overlap is evident. Thus, the JSPD typically costs far more than the traffic is likely to allow.

The roadmap for the rest of this paper is as follows. First, I will cite some reasons why it is particularly difficult to inject naval forces and capabilities into a truly joint arena. Second, I will review cases in the U.S. historical record which indicate how the process of resolving complicated interservice coordination controversies has followed a very consistent pattern over time. Third, some new factors requiring abandonment and replacement of the old tried and true approaches to future joint endeavors will be listed. Finally, I present some illustrative cases in point of joint planning opportunities that might be considered model templates for a new approach to joint issues.

## THE PLANNING BACKGROUND

The apparently universal failure to put service bickering aside in the interests of efficiency and the soundest possible national defense is commonly ascribed to blatant parochialism. This paper is based on the assumption that the reasons for differences of opinion about strategy, mission, and force priorities are frequently sound, and that the question of interest rather concerns the relative emphasis placed on each of the many ways for pursuing our various national security objectives.

The U.S. defense planning system today is not--and indeed never has been--very well suited to the task of making painful but necessary resource allocation tradeoffs. To compound this problem, our various constituent planning processes, for example, those established to acquire weapons, hire and retain people, and work smoothly with allies, are deficient as well.<sup>4</sup> In short, it is hard enough to plan coherently in one narrow, limited context, never mind when several opposed or divergent service interests are represented.

One of the reasons why joint service planning is far more difficult than the sum of its problematic parts would appear to make it is that in most general purpose force missions of interest, the Navy simply has an entirely different planning approach than the sister services with which

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<sup>4</sup> For a discussion of the U.S. historical record in this respect, see Robert W. Komer, *Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense?* Abt Books, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1984.

it might team. This is not to suggest that Air Force and Army planning exercises are universally congruent; I refer to a relative degree of coherence only.<sup>5</sup> For instance, in the 1930s, Navy and Army planning were more or less entirely unconnected, whereas Army and Air Force planning were dovetailed to an impressive degree.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, in World War II, there was a strident debate between the Army and Navy about the wisdom of a "Europe-first" strategy. By contrast, although the Army Air Force in Europe in World War II did run, from time to time, an "independent" strategic bombing campaign, targeting objectives were adjusted to support Army ground forces when there was such a need.<sup>7</sup>

As far as a distinct "Navy planning style" goes, it is important to keep certain facts in mind as we approach the interservice agenda in the years ahead, for many of them, short of some radical overhaul of the way that the U.S. Defense Department goes about its business, will persist and inevitably shape U.S. choices. Consider three such differences.

*First, unlike the other services, the Navy essentially has two enemies.* I am referring not to the Army and the Air Force, but to the *adversary* and the *naval environment*. From an historical perspective, the latter is a problem not confronted to anywhere near the same degree

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<sup>5</sup> The relatively tighter linkage of Air Force and Army planning processes is certainly a legacy of the fact that the Air Force was separated from the Army as late as 1947, not to mention the necessity for cooperation on the battlefield--so each can survive--much less fight. By contrast, nearly every other major national Air Force had been created during, or in the immediate aftermath of, the First World War.

<sup>6</sup> See Dana Mead, *U.S. Peacetime Strategic Planning, 1920-1941*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1967, for a comparison of different service planning styles. Also Roger Beaumont provides some historical material on the Army-Navy dispute over coastal defense and other roles in "Between Two Stools: Very Long Range Aircraft in Sea Control," *Air University Review*, September-October 1981.

<sup>7</sup> For instance, the Army Air Force's counter-industrial strategic bombing campaign was essentially "called off" in October 1943, with Eighth Air Force bombers being reassigned to targets relevant to the upcoming Operation OVERLORD. Note that this redirection of bombing priorities also reflected concern with the increasingly high attrition suffered during bombing attacks on deep industrial targets (a situation that was to be rectified later largely with adequate deliveries of long range fighter escorts).

by another service. Thus, backing up every division is a Corps area, Communications Zone, and, ultimately, sustaining and reinforcing manpower and material in the U.S. homeland. If land combat forces are disconnected from this support tail either by enemy action (e.g., when one is the victim of a flanking attack) or deliberate choice (as with an airborne drop) they may very well run extremely grave risks.<sup>8</sup>

To be useful, however, combat and support ships must deploy, and once deployed they are in a very meaningful way "disconnected" from their support base. Ships enter international waters almost immediately: beyond the twelve mile line there is no sanctuary, no threshold.<sup>9</sup> They are unmistakably on the front line.

A great many critical technical features amplify the meaning of this disconnection from support. We see, for instance, the strategic necessity of reliable and well distributed logistical and base infrastructure. When Patton's Third Army outran its logistics in its dash across France in 1944, it could dig in and await resupply. This would not be the case at sea, where the unavailability of resupply would at best neutralize a naval force militarily and at worst would spell disaster for it.<sup>10</sup> Though this logistical fact of life, first

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<sup>8</sup> For a detailed discussion of such logistical issues, see Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton*, Cambridge University Press, 1979. For classic cases of the consequences of major ground forces being "disconnected" from their supporting and reinforcing tail, we can consider the destruction of the surrounded Soviet 44th and 163rd divisions in the Winter War by the Finns, and the disaster sustained by the British 1st airborne division at Arnhem.

<sup>9</sup> As the by-now undoubtedly "early retired" commander of that Victor III SSN found during his encounter with the *Kitty Hawk* during *Team Spirit '84*, only broad guidance--in the form of "rules of the road" or such general principles (or "confidence building measures") as that between the U.S. and USSR intended to prevent accidents at sea--and good sense can provide any "territorial" security at sea in peace or crisis. Certainly such niceties would go straight out the window in severe crisis or wartime. If a Soviet tattletail shadowing the *Nimitz* is able to get the first shot in wartime then tonnage, capability differential, etc. are dangerously neutralized. We would thereby declare, and enforce with military action, "keep out" zones.

<sup>10</sup> Bernard Brodie elaborates upon this matter in *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1944, pp. 164-74. For what has to rank as one of the most pathetic cases in point of a naval logistics nightmare, see Peter Tsouras' account of the deployment of the Russian Baltic Fleet to the Far East in 1904-05, "Voyage of the Damned," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1982.

encountered during the conversion from wind to steam propulsion, has changed over the years to some degree with the advent of nuclear powered ships, underway replenishment, vertical onboard delivery, etc., it is unreasonable to expect that the future support context ever would differ materially from the modern present situation.<sup>11</sup>

Likewise, naval formations that do not bring with them--or are otherwise unable to provide--their own *specialized* combat capabilities can wind up in serious trouble. For a particularly controversial case in point, consider Marine Aviation. A Marine Air Wing can include more than 250 fixed and rotary wing aircraft representing a full spectrum of air combat and support capabilities (most of which could be put to use in support of operations other than purely amphibious ones). Yet frequently, proposals that these aircraft eventually come under higher echelon theater air component commanders (not necessarily during a Marine assault or deployment operation, but once it becomes clear that USMC forces are going to be in a theater for a good while) are categorically rejected by the Marines. In addition to the tendency of all the armed services to try to maintain operational control over their own force structure, the Marines defend their refusal to come under the aegis of a theater-wide air commander by arguing that they have deliberately foregone artillery and other organic land support in favor of aircraft able to perform these missions.<sup>12</sup> Thus, a Marine force deprived of its air power is often compared to an army division without its wheels and tracks.

Exactly the same is true with command and control: navies cannot rely on land lines or remote and redundant emitters. If radio emission discipline conditions, enemy countermeasures, or the tactical situation

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<sup>11</sup> Only nuclear submarine forces might be viewed as invulnerable to these influences: however, until that time that submarine forces can project conventional power against shore and maritime targets to the same degree that surface forces can today, we should expect no basic change in this fundamental state of affairs.

<sup>12</sup> Marines to this day suffer from what might be called the "Guadalcanal syndrome." The reference is to the Navy's temporary retirement from that battle due to heavy Japanese fire, a move which exposed the Marines to the enemy *without* the benefit of their offshore close support--hence the resistance to relying on others for such vital assistance.

require it, vital decisions, even strategic ones, must be made in the field and the forces concerned must be able to operate under special C3 circumstances. This could be for the sake not only of combat effectiveness, but for the very survival of the participants. It is doubtful, in other words, whether a task force commander operating with direct support SSNs under his control would welcome well-meaning outside offers to help with ASW duties.

In short, there are good tactical and technical reasons why Navy forces seek to be self sufficient units. This isn't to say that these tendencies should be allowed to reign supreme over all planning things naval. Rather, the reasons for a uniquely "maritime perspective" on various planning questions are long-standing and often persuasive ones, and proposed changes to current practises must be made with them in mind.

*Second, key parts of the Navy do not use for planning a canonical or specified threat, or even necessarily region, of operations.* To oversimplify a very complex problem, every military service or branch either plans for specific geographical contingencies (and the threats and other features that go with them) or it prepares for unspecified or an extremely broad range of contingencies. This distinction has enormous implications for command relationships, force sizing, and the attribution of budgetary priorities among competing enterprises. Consider it briefly.

For example, the Army and Air Force have planned all along for operations in Europe, Northeast Asia, and now, Southwest Asia. Certainly in the first two cases, the planning process has become rather formal over the years, and key assumptions for planning are quite detailed. For the sake of budget and posture planning, the idea is to determine optimal posture tradeoffs on the basis of the marginal contribution of capability increments to a region's defense. When faced with the task of buying an "n-th" increment of force structure, we should allocate our funds on the basis of which additional force structure elements would most enhance our odds in a particular planning scenario. Similarly, the total JSPD-type force can be computed simply by totting up all possible theaters of action and cobbling together the forces needed to defeat the threats found in those areas.

Thus, consider a popular scenario: CVBGs are operating against Soviet ships in the North Atlantic, USAF F-15s and USMC F-18s are on strip alert, respectively, at Keflavic and Bodo, and E-3As are flying continuous Airborne Early Warning orbits high above the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap (GIUK). Suddenly, an E-3A detects a mass attack by BACKFIRES rounding the North Cape. Alerted on their JTIDS data links, the carriers launch their F-14s, E-2Cs, and KC-6s, and prepare their F-18s, and Aegis cruisers are properly oriented to the approaching threat. As they transit the Norwegian Sea, the bomber waves suffer heavy attrition at the hands of Marine and Air Force planes before encountering the CVBG's several defense echelons. Not only is the threat cut down in size: moreover, the Soviet Naval Air Force's ability to launch a coordinated saturation cruise missile attack is disrupted. Furthermore, unless the BACKFIRES are flying one-way missions, they must run the reverse gauntlet, as well (this would increase the time spent in fuel-guzzling supersonic regimes and thereby cut into their effective attack radii).

USAF support for maritime missions also includes power projection against naval targets of interest. Given their long range and heavy payload capabilities, the advantages of using B-52s for mining have long been acknowledged.<sup>29</sup> Recently direct surface attack missions have been considered as well: experiments show that B-52s can successfully attack surface ships with HARPOON cruise missiles. Indeed, current plans are to modify some 30 B-52Gs for the sea control role. These planes will be supported by, among other things, 4 AWACS specially modified to incorporate the OUTLAW SHARK naval targeting system.<sup>30</sup>

Relatively less can be said about reciprocal arrangements. It is true that CVs can substitute for land-side air bases, but aside from nuclear strikes (for which we can use missiles or Long-Range Combat Aircraft), it is hard to think of any major contingency scenario where the availability of the limited resources provided by a CV would be

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<sup>29</sup> In any case, mining has never enjoyed a very high priority in Navy planning.

<sup>30</sup> "Gallery of USAF Weapons," *Air Force Magazine*, May 1984, p. 171.

for this reason, there are tremendous opportunities for the joint operation of land and sea-based airpower.

Three such technical constraints are especially important. First, fundamental range and payload constraints act on carrier based aircraft simply as a result of size and weight constraints. Second, the numbers of aircraft available at any time is limited by the deck space on the carrier.<sup>27</sup> Third, even given a dedicated station UNREP ship (AOE/AOR), limitations on the availability of fuel, ordnance, etc. will impose some operational constraints in combat situations. All in all, there may be basic limitations on the ability of a carrier to sustain either defensive or offensive operations on a certain scale in some situations.

While some of these problems can be eased by the operation of several carriers in task forces or by the deployment of carriers with specially tailored aircraft wings and support complements, a task force commander will still face tradeoffs when it comes to such tasks as maintaining a long-range forward deployed CAP, sustaining an AEW capability, carrying large payloads long distances, etc. In wartime situations, when 24 hour-a-day alert conditions are essential and where the effects of weather could be especially important, alternative measures to take the basic pressure off the carrier force itself so that it can respond at maximum capability when the time for decisive action arrives begin to look very attractive.<sup>28</sup>

Recently a number of pertinent joint Air Force/Navy activities have been explored which show great promise. Fleet air defense enhancement techniques evaluated so far have included the use of E-3A (AWACS) to detect enemy aircraft and ships, and the deployment of land-based interceptor aircraft in likely corridors of high density anti-ship bomber routing. In this way, a carrier needn't tie up all of its fighters and tankers in order to maintain a tenuous maximum radius air defense screen.

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<sup>27</sup> A carrier's capacity is measured in A-7 equivalents. Capacity is that deck space remaining after subtracting the landing area on the flight deck. Typically a *Nimitz*-class carrier has storage capacity for about 100 A-7 equivalent aircraft. Typically a full load will be about 80 aircraft of various types.

<sup>28</sup> For instance, we can maintain a surge capability to be "cued" for a "most efficient" defense, or we could use some multi-mission F-18s in strike roles, as opposed to tying them up with air defense duties if conditions allow.



## Technological Developments

The joker in the deck of service roles and missions is called air power. Prior to the widespread military application of aviation, the assignment of areas of service responsibility was a fairly orderly process. But because it could be used in both maritime and land conflicts, air power ignited an interservice debate that perseveres to this date. For instance, in the 1930s, air power became a major source of tension between the Army and the Navy as bombing enthusiasts masqueraded as the pretenders to the coastal defense crown. Within both the Army and Navy before and during World War II, there was considerable friction between aviation advocates and the more traditional ground and battleship schools--and the aviation side effectively won the debate in each case.

Since the war, things have become even more complex: by a conservative count, the four U.S. armed services maintain some dozen separate active and reserve combat air establishments. Predictably, most post-war military debates have had something to do with air power. How should we go about strategic bombing? What mix of tactical conventional and nuclear air power should be bought? Who should provide close air support for land forces? To what degree should we pay for mobile, as opposed to fixed, air bases? Technological changes have perturbed the apparent role of aviation in combat before (precipitating service fracas), and contemporary developments promise to be no exception to the rule. The recent scramble for control of the expanded *aerospace* medium promises to add a new dimension to this venerable fray.

When we are considering potential maritime conflicts, we need to consider two missions in which air power would play a vital role: fleet air defense and power projection. Independent naval planning for air warfare has led to the design and deployment of carrier-based aircraft able to perform all necessary tasks required for the accomplishment of these missions. A full carrier wing includes early warning, reconnaissance, strike, air defense, aerial tanker, anti-submarine, transport, and associated support aircraft. However, the nature of carrier operations imposes fundamental constraints on the design of airplanes which even the most advanced technology cannot totally elude:

would normally lack access to the region prior to the onset of hostilities.

Defense of this troublesome region requires contributions from all branches of each service, both because the tactical situation requires a full spectrum of capabilities and *because no service has very many forces to spare after the requirements for potential simultaneous conflicts elsewhere are factored into the planning equation*. Now in preparing SWA defense, by far the most important issue for planning concerns timing. No matter what other provisions are made, it is critically important to deploy *some* capability into the region very quickly. The forces called for by this dictum, and the means for deploying them, represent a true multi-service force package.

Perhaps more important to our longer term defense prospects is the ability to prosecute an air war to our advantage from the start. SWA is a far more difficult defense problem than Vietnam in every way save one: air power *can* play a potentially decisive role. This is a natural consequence of the interdiction possibilities before us, the great distances involved, the prevailing flora, terrain, and weather, and the probable heavy use by the Soviets of troops in *desant* operations.

However, with the various opportunities before us also come some liabilities. The inadequate base infrastructure, threat to air operations, long ranges, and requirement for a large number of sorties in a short period of time will place enormous pressures on us to exploit every possible joint force synergism. Ground-based aircraft in the theater, carrier based aircraft in the Indian Ocean, and long-range out-of-theater forces (like SAC's conventionally armed Strategic Projection Force) will have to work together if U.S. aims in the region are to be furthered. Given the requirements for heavy tanker, air defense, logistical, electronic warfare, and intelligence support, the all-important air war of the first few days and weeks over SWA will put demands on joint service performance that are literally unprecedented.

- 4 Widespread agreement that U.S. national security organization leaves much to be desired, particularly in terms of the quality and timeliness of uniformed military advice to civilian planners.

Consider the first three of these developments.

### **New Strategic Requirements, Particularly the SWA Contingency**

To paraphrase one commentator, "We have a Europe oriented Army, a Pacific oriented Navy, and a victory through air power Air Force." This menu of capabilities would be fine if no other theaters existed to pose such a demanding set of defense problems that we couldn't count on putting something together out of pocket. Unfortunately, just such a theater has emerged: Southwest Asia.

In 1979-1980, the collapse of the so-called Northern Tier and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan shocked the nation into the recognition that realistic force and employment planning for a Southwest Asian scenario had to be done. The difficulties in operating effectively in such a logistically demanding and politically problematic environment are exacerbated by the steadily improved Soviet military potential we face, the dilution, over the past two decades, of our allies' contribution to security in areas outside of those of their immediate territorial concern, and the pressing need to finish tidying up post-Vietnam war force structure and readiness problems.

Unhappily, this very demanding contingency falls between the proverbial bar stools: more specifically, it combines all the worst features of the NATO European scenario with all those of a traditional "third world" planning scenario. On the one hand, there is a possibility that a threat could emerge to the region on very short notice, and that the threat could number the Soviet Union among its members. Moreover, it is impractical for the U.S. to go it alone in any attempt at regional defense: but the diplomatic situation is such that we could confront a number of political obstacles in peacetime preparations for conventional defense of the area. And like most third world scenarios, planning is riven with major uncertainties, and we

## SOME RECENT FACTORS DRIVING JOINT SERVICE REFORM

Agitation for "better interservice cooperation" is a hardy perennial. As noted previously, the U.S. joint planning system as a whole is able to adapt to *slowly emerging* pressures. In other words, if there is time to coordinate operations, then a reasonably satisfactory jury rigged joint command and/or operational structure probably can be put in place.

But to anticipate a future conflict on the "Vietnam model"--i.e., a conflict in which a cumbersome bureaucracy can be adjusted and fine-tuned as the specifics of the contingency become clear--seems less and less prudent with every passing day. Therefore, there is the risk that the joint system, which can respond when it has not only the need, but also the time, to do so, will be pushed to the breaking point by a fast-paced emergency.

Many factors have given rise to substantially heightened interest in improved interservice policy, operational, and resource coordination, but among them four stand out as particularly important. All four have basically emerged from the same matrix: they all essentially originated at the nadir of the so-called post-Southeast Asian war "hangover" (the period FY71-75) when U.S. conventional force deficiencies seemed glaring and the will to do something about them was nowhere in sight. They are:

1. Changing threats and strategic requirements of which the most important by far has been the emergence of a Southwest Asian contingency as a defense obligation of priority at least equal to that of the Northeast Asian one
2. Technological developments which challenge many of the assumptions by which service domains of responsibility have been circumscribed
3. The general recognition that the budget is a finite entity, as is its probable growth rate, and that financial realities will over time require more effective coordination, like it or not, and

Fourth, we have seen time and again how the U.S. defense planning process *per se* is ill-designed to pursue interservice collaborative possibilities. There are a number of reasons why, but the following three are certainly representative. One, each service is responsible for the design of its own *doctrine*. Take the case of PACOM as one in point: here, the aviation capabilities of PacFleet and PACAF are planned in a way consistent with joint guidance from the JCS. However, it is impossible for CinCPAC to dictate the Pacific Air Forces' planning insofar as that "influence" might infringe on USAF doctrine: therefore, PACAF can reclama CinCPAC actions directly to its service chief who as a member of the JCS can make his concerns known where it counts.

Two, there is the case of *training*. Each service is understandably interested in assuring an adequate degree of proficiency in its basic roles and missions: even if joint service-related training were to be called for under basic doctrine, such training probably would represent, from a budgetary point of view, a relatively low priority and wouldn't ordinarily be pursued with much vigor. On those occasions when major joint exercises do occur, they take place on a target of opportunity basis or they receive special funding as a result of their political sensitivity.

Three, there is the inherent disconnection between the services--responsible for designing and maintaining the force posture--and the joint service commanders who must fight with them, (i.e., the six Unified commanders). Naturally, the isolation of those who are most familiar with immediate defense problems from the force structure decision making process will not tend to encourage optimal cooperation.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Note that there has been some progress in this area lately; since 1982, the CinCs have routinely appeared to make their cases before the DRB and JCS.

reinforcement and expeditionary forces based in CONUS (STRICOM from 1961 until 1972 and, after that, REDCOM). Nor are, say, the Sixth Fleet carrier air wings under the direct opcon of the allied air component command for Southern NATO.

It is also revealing that in probably the most important single joint service initiative of the post-World War II period--the creation of a unified strategic nuclear war planning entity responsible for designing an integrated operational plan for all central nuclear forces--the Navy still did not cede operational control of its SSBNs (and for a brief period CV and SSG/surface-SLCM forces) to the Director of the new Joint Strategic Target Planning staff, namely CinCSAC. In short, there is a great *reluctance to give up operational control*: for reasons discussed previously, the Navy is particularly resistant to any potential loss of operational control over its forces.

Third, when important and usually time-urgent interservice coordination problems arise, useful solutions commonly are improvisational, with existing arrangements and procedures seconded to *ad hoc* regimes. This improvisation takes place at every level from the most grand strategic matters on down to modified small unit tactics. The ability to jettison old plans and principles in favor of new ones has historically been assured by the relatively great degree of control over the course of post-World War II events exercised by the United States.<sup>24</sup>

Again, Vietnam, the great cadaver for students of U.S. defense planning, provides excellent illustrations. With the origination of a major land war with virtually no strictly naval component, the nominal theater commander under the UCP (PACOM) was replaced for all practical matters by MACV, in effect, an independent land theater command.<sup>25</sup> In short, effective interservice cooperation to date has usually been a child of necessity, not one of deliberate preplanning.

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<sup>24</sup> See Kevin N. Lewis, "Responding to Soviet Military Initiatives in the Third World," The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1982.

<sup>25</sup> In theory, MACV was a "sub-unified command"--but in fact, MACV reported directly to the NCA through the JCS.

This practise has persisted not just in significant actions like Korea and Vietnam, but in more modest engagements like Grenada, as well. In the Vietnam conflict, to control tactical airspace as well as partition the theater into regions of separate responsibility for planning, the Air Force and Navy divided the skies over North Vietnam into seven route-packs in 1965. Exactly the same thing had been done in Korea, where the Far East Air Force and the Navy divided up strike responsibility into separate airspace allocations for the FEAF and for Task Force 77.<sup>23</sup>

The same was true to a lesser extent on the ground, with I Corps being the USMC area of operation in Vietnam (although an Army division was deployed there, too). In Grenada, a smaller and much more *ad hoc* arrangement, the Army's interest in participating in what was originally conceived as a Navy-Marine operation led eventually to the partitioning of the island into Army and USMC land areas of operation.

Second, all services, but especially the Navy and Marines, have tended to resist being placed under the operational command of another service. Rather, cooperative measures take place under the rubric of assignment of units "in support of" some other command. Again, Vietnam provides a classic case of this practise in wartime: the commander of 7th Air Force under MACV generally controlled only those USAF tactical aircraft based in South Vietnam or Thailand. But also participating in the air war was SAC and the Navy, off as many as three carriers on Yankee Station. (As noted above, Marine aviation remained under the direct control of III MAF, and there was also the RVNAF to keep in mind.)

Peacetime arrangements reflect an identical phenomenon. For instance, the Navy has successfully resisted incorporation into normal joint strategic contingency commands. For instance, no Navy forces have been under operational control of the U.S. command in charge of those

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tendency of some air power advocates to promote an independent bombing campaign further complicated affairs. We see, for instance, separate British theaters (e.g., the China-Burma-India theater), and, from time to time, separate air offensives.

<sup>23</sup> For a detailed account of command relationships in both Korea and Vietnam, see William Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars*, Department of the Air Force, 1978, particularly pp. 65-110.

stood, by winning the war at sea in a day, we could be signing the death warrant for our expeditionary forces if *we* were to begin the war on terms highly unfavorable to our land force defenders.

On the other hand, if we do hold the line early on in a land war somewhere, we will ultimately beat the Soviets in a conventional war *if we can sustain and reinforce our troops on a worldwide basis*. The U.S. Navy is certainly able to remove the Soviet naval threat ultimately, by hook or crook, but we have seriously neglected *the single most important determinant of success in a long conventional war: sealift*. There is a "window of vulnerability" between our early deploying lift and the time when we can begin putting new transport bottoms on line. If we do not fill that void, we are potentially doomed. In short, enormous inconsistencies can plague our planning if we allow our theater and maritime force planning to go their own merry ways.

#### PAST PERFORMANCE IN INTERSERVICE COORDINATION

Given such unique aspects of the maritime planning process as those described above, the lessons suggested by the historical record when it comes to interservice coordination are quite predictable. Some brief highlights, or more correctly "lowlights," will indicate how our failure to bring together the various service planning processes--to blend, if you will, basically different planning "styles"--has caused us trouble, and may, if some issues go unresolved, someday spell disaster. The following are among the lessons that can be culled out of the historical record that are relevant to the present discussion.

First and foremost, a straightforward division of responsibilities, areas of operation, etc. has been the preferred technique for accommodating multiple services within a particular theater of operations. If conditions allow, different services may elect to undertake operations in entirely different theaters. The classic case in point, of course, is that of the Second World War, in which three essentially distinct "theaters" existed: an Army one in Europe under Eisenhower, and both Army and Navy theaters in the Pacific under MacArthur and Nimitz. To be sure, all the services were involved in each: but the point is that the direction of the war, strategic priorities, etc. were more or less determined by the service dominating each theater.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> The participation of Allies, especially the British, and the



important still, *enduring*, strategic results can be achieved in a very short while. If you are a maritime power, then, as Churchill noted about Jellicoe at Jutland, decisive naval success might not win the war, but a decisive defeat could definitely lose it for you. Accordingly, the American Navy plans more for a second Midway than for a third Battle of the Atlantic. Not only must powerful forces be in being,<sup>20</sup> moreover, but plans must be bold, for if we do not remove the threat early on, even an inferior enemy can tie up our superior forces in a defensive stalemate--and prevent us from striking elsewhere.

When it comes to smooth coordination with other services, however, this orientation is not an entirely reliable formula for success. To be sure, our fascination with nuclear weapons, the existence of powerful forces-in-being of all types on both sides, and our leading role on the various front lines of the free world's defense tend to suppress our recollection of the fact that our traditional approach to security planning has *not* embraced readiness as a top priority.<sup>21</sup> The would-be rapid deployers and standing start warriors of the 1980s would be well advised to study the ominous lessons of, say, our feeble attempt at rapid deployment in response to North Korea's attack of the South in June 1950. In short, there remains an American heritage of protracted, mobilized attrition warfare that doesn't sit well with the Mahanian ideal of early, decisive commitment.

This leads to a number of serious planning disconnections; their consequences may comprise the worst potential planning pitfall before us today. On the one hand, there simply is no substitute for preempting conventionally against the Soviet Navy in a crisis: we would be ill-advised not to strike the first blows at sea. However, this might be a step which would play to the Soviets' larger strategic advantage. Depending on where the theater airland conflict reinforcement situation

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<sup>20</sup> It is not prudent to plan for new warship construction in *any* future conflict. It is an extreme case, but if the *Nimitz* construction schedule had been overlaid on World War II, we would see that, if that CVN had been authorized when the Germans invaded Poland, the ship would have been commissioned two years after Hiroshima.

<sup>21</sup> It is a vital, but often overlooked, fact that adjusting to our new role as a standing, ready, worldwide military force has posed more problems for our planners and strategists than did the need to get used to the so-called "nuclear age."

fairly predictable character of many dimensions of the local conflict. Perhaps the relative clarity of the tactical situation in the Caribbean and the corresponding operational familiarity with, and relevance of, preplanned contingency options explain the speed and efficiency with which the recent Grenada operation was put together.

On the other hand, the Pacific is so large, and the number of possible scenarios so vast, that detailed preplanning of any kind must be suspect. Indeed, under the Unified Command Plan, PACOM's territory incorporates literally half the world and ranges from South Africa to Alaska, and from Antarctica to Korea. The two American wars of the post-World War II period took place in Pacific Command's domain, although neither was primarily a naval war.

Hence, joint planning for WestPac and Indian Ocean contingencies would ordinarily be particularly difficult. Unfortunately, for those attempting to work out details of a demanding Southwest Asian contingency, the new U.S. Central Command does not incorporate much in the way of maritime responsibilities *per se*, and so an RDF-type scenario would still involve heavily the European and Pacific Commands.<sup>18</sup>

*Third, naval forces must be ready for early, and perhaps decisive, action.* Most Americans consider sudden, decisive conflicts to be a byproduct of the development of nuclear weapons, but naval planners everywhere know otherwise. Whether they are limited or general, continental warfare campaigns tend to become attrition contests (unless one side or the other loses the political will to continue the fight or unless one antagonist can *totally* dominate its adversaries). Similarly, maritime activities undertaken *to support* continental campaigns--blockades, *guerres du course*, and even "island hopping" amphibious offensives--produce their victorious effects on an extended time scale.

Like all classical "counterforce" wars, however, battles to achieve naval superiority *can* prove decisive<sup>19</sup> in the sense that major, and more

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<sup>18</sup> Thus, CENTCOM's area of responsibility includes only the contiguous land mass and two internal bodies of water, the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. Thus, the seam problem that was one of the rationales for creating a separate regional command has only been partially solved.

<sup>19</sup> Naturally, the extent to which these campaigns will have an enduring impact on the total war depends on many other factors.

Finally, total force naval planning--given the many very diverse missions and ships to accomplish them--calls for such an approach. For these and other reasons, both bad and good, much Navy planning tends to be far less concrete than that of other services.

As a result, naval force planning as a whole tends to be based on often arbitrary rules imposed at the highest level basically by fiat. (Certainly justifications are given for internal mixes and requirements.)<sup>16</sup> A classic case in point was Imperial Britain's "two power" planning rule, which simply required that Britain's fleet be capable of defeating the combined navies of the second and third largest naval powers, regardless of who or where they were. Though it is couched in sophisticated analysis, the "600 ship navy" is a horse of like color. Indeed, that latter total force "requirement" remains the same even as the internal mix of the proposed fleet is repeatedly adjusted and reframed to account for changes in the operating environment, threat, etc.<sup>17</sup>

Needless to say, this practice makes coordination on force sizing, contingency planning, and budget priorities between the Navy and other services difficult. The degree of difficulty can vary greatly from naval theater to naval theater. In the North Atlantic, most aspects of the naval war relate directly to the reinforcement and sustaining resupply of allied ground and tactical air forces engaged in a NATO-Pact conflict. And in some of the smaller naval arenas (for instance, the Mediterranean and Caribbean seas), naval requirements and possible plans are, relatively speaking, constrained by the relatively small space and

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vessel's lifetime. The two CVNs ordered in FY1983 will still be in service, at least if present plans hold, into the second quarter of the twenty-first century.

<sup>16</sup> Naturally, we can plan the constituent components of a fleet in considerable technical detail. We can determine, for instance, how many submarines are required for a certain type of barrier defense, or how many ships of what type are needed to move a Marine division. However, the point is that it is not clear how the various "building blocks" of a fleet should combine to make up the whole of the Navy.

<sup>17</sup> Since a "600 ship fleet" target was introduced a decade ago, the internal mix has changed depending on other developments. Requirements for amphibious lift have, for instance, declined, as have the numbers of ships required to round out carrier battle groups (e.g., direct escort ship goals for each CV have been reduced from eight to six, although a direct support SSN has been added).

On the other hand, some defense planning does not address such specific problems. Contingency planning may be done, but the extremely broad range of possible problems before us militates against focusing too much on one or another of the scenarios.<sup>13</sup> Examples of this type of planning include special forces preparations, and many kinds of naval capability. Let me briefly describe the implications for interservice cooperation of a usually highly nonspecific naval force structure and employment planning problem.

To a much greater degree than for the land forces and their supporting air power elements, planning for naval employment and force structure options in peacetime tends to be based neither on any explicit threat nor on a set of presumed "likely scenario features." It is occasionally not even very clear (compared with land force planning) *where* fighting will take place, *how long* different phases of a war will last, or *what* the roster of friends, foes, and neutrals will look like. The lack of specificity and concreteness in the assumptions used for planning is, of course, consistent with the ability of fleets to deploy world-wide. It also reflects the relative longevity of the units in the navy force structure.<sup>14</sup> For just the same reason it is harder to modify the basic force structure as threats and missions evolve over time.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Alternatively, and the specificity of the planning process aside, planning can be done on a separate or "fenced" basis: by virtue of the fact that the capability in question is somehow special, it is planned according to special guidance and does not in principle compete with other "alternative" priorities. Examples of this kind of problem are the strategic nuclear forces and strategic mobility resources, excepting prepositioning and only then, providing that in-theater logistical infrastructure is not a major problem. Obviously, if in-theater bases and transport networks are peculiar or deficient, then we will have to plan palliative measures explicitly for those regions. Note that in many cases there are, however, very flexible ways of anticipating logistical problems in a number of locales. One way of dealing with insufficient port facilities in the Mideast would be to construct them. But there are more strategically flexible options (e.g., crane ships) that can be exploited.

<sup>14</sup> Over the course of thirty or more years, it is not clear that the same set of allies and enemies will be encountered: an extreme illustration of this fact is that the *Iowa* class battleships, originally built to fight the Japanese, may now be used to defend them.

<sup>15</sup> Simply put, ships last a long time--30 to 50 years--and the military problem before naval planners can change markedly during a

pivotal.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, the relatively modest amount of gunfire and missile support, the availability of many alternatives, and the existence of probably higher priority naval missions combine to rule out much of a role for sea-based support of significant general purpose land force engagements, again with the exception of supporting Marine landings and conducting the Navy's present land force support mission roster (providing Convoy Escort Groups in particular).<sup>32</sup> This, at any rate, describes the extent to which new technological opportunities have supported expanded interservice maritime operations to date.

### Budget Issues

Like it or not, financial realities will over time increasingly require more effective joint service coordination. This is the case for two main reasons.

First, both discrete events and long-term trends have combined to impose unusually tight budget pressures on all the services.<sup>33</sup> Discrete developments include the diversion of half a trillion dollars to the Southeast Asian war (not to mention the subsequent post-war budgetary "hangover"), the adoption of an AVF, an abrupt rise in energy prices after 1973, and the collapse or abandonment by others of certain regional defense schemes--with the U.S. compelled to assume a greater regional burden over time.

Adverse trends include steady "modernization inflation," relentless Soviet force structure modernization and expansion, the continuing decline of the 18-year-old manpower pool, and the general deterioration of portions of the defense industrial base. These various causes have placed such an intense burden on U.S. defense budgets--and especially on force structure modernization budgets--that more efficient joint service coordination is not merely desirable: it is *essential*.

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<sup>31</sup> Carriers would, of course, be vital in a number of special actions, as was the case in the "Desert One" hostage rescue attempt or the final evacuation of Saigon.

<sup>32</sup> See James Hessman, "Sea Power and the Central Front," *Air Force Magazine*, July 1983, pp. 52-58.

<sup>33</sup> See K. N. Lewis, *Budget Constraints and Future Posture Planning Issues*, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, (forthcoming).

Second, technological, strategic, and other influences have over time tended to increase the services' tendency to acquire *redundant* force structure and missions. It isn't appropriate to catalogue them all, so consider a couple of examples. Following the divestiture by the U.S. Army of its Air Force Component in 1947, the Army neglected to explore a certain alternative to fixed-wing aircraft, namely the helicopter, just as the Air Force neglected close air support.<sup>34</sup> However, developments in the late 1950s and early 1960s<sup>35</sup> soon changed this picture: so much so, in fact, that by the mid 1970s, *both* services were investing heavily in a number of systems intended to fill what was seen as a failure by the other to provide adequate CAS.

Similarly, since the renaissance of conventional tactical air power in the early 1960s, both the Air Force and Navy often have found themselves producing fighters with similar basic characteristics. But the opportunity to save substantial money by producing *joint* service fighters has not been seized upon by either service--except in such cases as the F-110/F-4B and A-7D when, for want of an Air Force competitor and given the pressures of the Vietnam war, major joint procurement programs were forced on the USAF by OSD.

More characteristically, the two major *intended* joint fighter acquisition programs of the last two decades both ended in failure. The TFX program fissioned into separate Air Force and Navy aircraft programs (F-111 and F-14) after a controversial development phase, as did the Light Weight Fighter (LWF) program. In the LWF program, both the Air Force and Navy were to buy a common "low mix" aircraft, but again two

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<sup>34</sup> At the bleakest point of the Pusan perimeter defense, for example, the Air Force and Army, despite the pressures upon them, differed considerably about what the Air Force should do. Despite headquarters' endorsement of Close Air Support as the top priority, the Air Force continued its campaign of interdiction.

<sup>35</sup> Technological developments, pressure from Secretary of Defense McNamara to explore airmobility (recall the "Howze Panel" report), and the demonstrated utility of helicopters in the Vietnam war all led to great acceptance of these systems by the Army. In addition, the Air Force--again as a result of Vietnam requirements--became more interested in ground attack: two old production lines were reopened, and eventually a new Counterinsurgency aircraft--later to be respecified as a NATO-oriented close support aircraft (A-X, now A-10)--was designed.

separate airplanes (the F-16 and F-18) were ultimately procured. Thus, we hear criticism today that inefficient spending overlaps exist.<sup>16</sup>

Obviously, both of these factors must be reckoned with in the name of efficiency. Excessive coverage of one requirement may come at the expense of other needs, and redundancy may also lead to a reduced willingness by the taxpayer to cover an appropriate overall level of defense spending.

#### SELECTED OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING CONTINENTAL/MARITIME COORDINATION

I suggested above that we can think about the joint planning problem in terms of three elements: efficiency, operational coordination, and strategic coherence. I have also reviewed the background of the Navy's different planning "style". When overlaid, these considerations suggest a master resume of possible promising future cooperative undertakings; from this list, I will select the following points for discussion here:

- Technological possibilities provide new opportunities for interservice cooperation, and hence allow us to do things more efficiently, provided that we avoid duplicating missions.
- Not all Marine Corps forces that *might* be employed in a flexible way *will* be employed in a flexible way; therefore, realistic consideration should be given to the increased integration of certain USMC forces into the more specific planning contingencies we find in major land theaters.
- Basic strategic considerations before us--including some matters relating to arms control and space policy--need to be focused before unwise precedents are set or arms control opportunities lost.

Let us briefly sketch out some ways in which we might improve upon our not excellent record in each of these cases.

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<sup>16</sup> See, for example, William W. Kaufmann, "The Defense Budget," in J. Pechman, Ed., *Setting National Priorities, the Fiscal Year 1984 Budget*, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1983.

## Technological Options

As noted above, technological change has frequently spawned interservice coordination problems. This will doubtless continue to be the case in the future. At the same time, a number of technological developments might create exciting new possibilities for better combined arms performance in maritime conflicts. Let me list a few of these here and suggest ways in which the land-based services might help their maritime colleagues and vice versa.

*Land-based support of maritime forces.* I have already indicated how both forward deployed and long-range CONUS-based aircraft can support naval forces: barring the acquisition of enough carrier groups to satisfy all JCS approved carrier missions, we should determine how land-based tactical and strategic air power can complement and, indeed, enhance the offensive striking power of CVBGs by satisfying existing requirements and opening up new deployment options. After all, the carrier's strong suit is its offensive striking power--if land-based air can be used to free up carriers for aggressive action, then the Navy stands to gain much by better USAF-USN cooperation.

As noted above, current cooperative possibilities include airborne early warning and defense cueing, fighter barriers, and the use of long range combat aircraft for mining and direct attack on ships. So far, these activities have generally been exploratory in nature, and so the obvious recommendation is to *implement* such measures fully. In addition, we must ask what additional options are possible. Most ways of expanding upon the menu of possible USAF support measures for maritime forces are probably just expansions on existing themes.<sup>37</sup> In particular, follow-on weapons and munitions are desirable: something along the lines of the now defunct MRASM and joint tactical missile system should be a leading candidate for Air Force acquisition for maritime employment. Attack options could then be expanded to include such targets as SNAF bases, Soviet naval infantry as they operate, and the like. Perhaps the new ASW stand-off weapon would be modified for air launching.

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<sup>37</sup> A number of supplementary joint service measures, e.g., airlift of routine and combat maritime capabilities, weather support, etc. are routine business and are not discussed here.



In this regard, the retention of a substantial force of B-52 aircraft on active duty for these and other missions with conventional weapons is *absolutely essential*. Present plans call for the earlier than heretofore scheduled retirement of nearly 100 B-52Gs.<sup>38</sup> When used for long-endurance, high altitude patrols, however, there is no real engineering reason to retire these planes before perhaps the year 2000. Depending on deployment and patrol areas it might take between three and eight B-52s to support one on constant patrol: heavy tanker support and other surge measures could increase this ratio somewhat. Thus, anywhere between about 12 to more than 30 B-52s could be maintained on combat patrols. With a TOMAHAWK-class missile and inputs from AWACS and other naval targeting data collection resources, this should be sufficient to place at risk a substantial fraction of the enemy's surface shipping.<sup>39</sup>

Pending the successful integration of the weapons, platforms, and concepts for joint maritime employment we presently have or are considering today, it is perhaps premature to outline highly ambitious programs for the future. But simple extrapolations along the lines of existing enterprises are possible. For instance, one very promising class of future USAF maritime support efforts would defend the U.S. Navy by taking on and destroying the *Soviets'* ability to use land based aviation against *our* fleets. A counter-SUAWACS capability, then, would be not just a theater or a strategic resource but a maritime one: in this regard, some new weapon analogous to ASALM might be considered again.

If adequate communications and coordination doctrine could be worked out, moreover, it is possible to imagine joint SSN-bomber operations. Such tactics would use the SSN as a mobile sonar facility, while exploiting the bomber's payload and ability to rapidly follow up contacts at long ranges. And of course, there are a variety of supporting space roles and missions (which are treated separately below).

<sup>38</sup> See Edgar Ulsamer, "Early Retirement for B-52Gs," *Air Force Magazine*, October 1983, p. 14.

<sup>39</sup> There have been recommendations that the U.S. establish its own counterpart to the Soviet Union's Naval Air Force. For one discussion see W.K. Sullivan, "Now is the Time to: Rethink, Redesign, and Redeploy Naval Aviation," *Naval War College Review*, March-April 1982.

*Maritime support of land-based forces.* It seems likely that the maritime services' ability to support the land-based ground and air forces will remain more or less in line with present arrangements (convoy escort, destruction of enemy sea-borne forces, allocation of "surplus" USMC air sorties to the Army, and the like). What would seem to define the scope of maritime operations in support of land forces are unpredictable scenario features. For instance, a sudden theater reverse might mean that only carrier bombers would be within reach of key targets, and so on.<sup>40</sup> An expanded USMC V/STOL force could, moreover, compensate temporarily for the heavy damage of some air bases in certain scenarios.

There are some possible new ways in which the Navy and Marine Corps might support the land-oriented services, though these applications would probably tend to be rather specialized. The Navy could, for instance, support joint space operations by deploying a space-launch capability aboard its *Ohio*-class SSBNs. It may also be possible to use TLAM-C for airbase attack and defense suppression, particularly in preemption scenarios: it would be advantageous to expand the azimuth of the missile threat to the Soviets and to force enemy radars to emit while under TOMAHAWK attack (thereby opening them up to USAF suppression).<sup>41</sup>

### How Much Flexibility is Enough?

The U.S. Marine Corps presently maintains four divisions altogether, each with its own supporting wing. However, we presently own only about one division's assault lift (plus overhead), and under present plans to expand to a 600 ship fleet, we will only add another enhanced brigade's lift. This leaves on the order of two and a half Marine divisions who must either wait to deploy in sequential operations or who will be employed in some other (non-amphibious) role.

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<sup>40</sup> Exactly this happened in Korea in 1950 when most air bases in the South were overrun. As many as five carriers provided support. However, this was a temporary situation.

<sup>41</sup> A discussion of interservice cooperation in special warfare roles is beyond the scope of this paper, but these applications are also potentially very promising.

The odds in favor of a series of large amphibious operations in the World War II Pacific style are not good. Barring extended mobilization, the U.S. and its allies simply do not maintain the force structure required to carry out campaigns in which Marines seize areas and then pull out as the Army takes over. It is highly likely, moreover, that the Marines will, generally speaking, stay where they are deployed and will require extensive support, a task which may, when attrition is factored in, account for much of their shipping. The ability of LHA/LHDs to support AV-8B "Harriers" has been demonstrated, and so some amphibious assets may, in some lesser threat theaters, serve as small carriers.

Amphibious shipping would also be urgently needed, moreover, to deploy a number of MAUs at key spots around the world in order to seize bases and chokepoints, and deter or destroy the military forces of any opportunistic third world aggressors. Moreover, given the relative priorities of different theaters and the present force structure, it will probably be necessary to deploy (if not directly into the theater at least into a forward strategic reserve position) all three active divisions *at the outset* of a major confrontation.

If we carry out a traditional amphibious assault, probably no more than an enhanced brigade will be involved. Assuming that the Marine reserve serves to fill attrition and that a wing-equivalent of Marine air will be appropriated by the Navy, we need to account for two and a half MAFs. One is more or less obligated to Japan/Korea. Of the remaining 1.5, we would presumably make some allocation of forces among NATO land theaters of great naval interest (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, or along the Mediterranean littoral). Inevitably we would also earmark some forces for the Persian Gulf area.

In these cases, however, we find a distinct need for some degree of specialization (given environmental conditions, the threats faced, etc.). Under the circumstances, it might be better to trade off the "flexibility" provided by an amphibious Corps all of whose elements are equipped and train in a standard way in favor of more specialized preparation of some major USMC formations for specific theaters. In this way, we could optimally merge the Marine Corps, existing light army

airborne, air assault, and assorted special forces, and the planned new light army infantry divisions in such a way that overlaps are minimized, but many specialized combat conditions anticipated.

In short, the Army and Marine Corps should coordinate their force planning to ensure that the maximum range of effective specialized scenario options is available. If the contingency we face turns out not to be a major war, but some "off-design" come-as-you-are scenario, we would, by such coordination, have maximized the probability that we would be able to execute a timely response. It is possible, of course, simply to plan to adapt general purpose units for special requirements, as we did in Vietnam. But an alarmingly large number of scenarios are plausible in which important interests requiring a military commitment could develop--and in which we would not be the sole controllers of the time-table and tempo of the conflict.<sup>42</sup>

Exactly the same recommendation can be made for better USAF-Marine Air coordination. The reasons for the USMC's desire to retain continuing operational control over its air assets have been described above. But the usual arguments would seem to pale somewhat in those scenarios in which Marine Air-Ground Task Forces remain in a particular theater over an extended period of time. In critical situations, it is essential to optimize available strike and other resources, just as it is inefficient to overuse aircraft (e.g., as mobile on-call artillery) when the situation does not so require. Accordingly, most Marine aviation resources should come under the control of the theater air component commander. This arrangement should not interfere with the Marine's ability to carry out combat deployments. Nor is the assignment of Army and USAF support of USMC troops ruled out.

### Strategic Considerations

For the services, strategic force issues tend to be the most "private" ones when it comes to admitting outsiders (whether they be other services, allies, or civilians): the Navy's steadfast resistance to SAC recommendations of a unified strategic command in the late 1950s are well-known. Similarly, the services have not elected to cooperate

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<sup>42</sup> See Kevin N. Lewis, "The Role of Escalation in Sealift Planning," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1983.

on strategic armaments when this rare possibility does arise.<sup>43</sup> That being the case, it is not surprising that a number of important joint strategic force controversies continue to simmer.

Perhaps one of the leading cases in point is the question of who should control U.S. space warfare assets, what U.S. space defense capabilities should be tested and, maybe, deployed, and, throughout all this, what arms control efforts should be attempted. The space planning problem, from a joint service point of view, suggests the analogue of a physical law, namely "conservation of trouble." Put very simply, if the Navy successfully carries out its objectives in space defense and space arms control, then problems may thereby emerge for the Air Force and Army--and vice versa. However such issues are resolved, it is absolutely essential for the sake of economy, policy coherence, and the conduct of our foreign and arms control policies to unify the U.S. military space effort.

The JCS has endorsed to the NCA, in JCS memorandum 296-83, the concept of a unified space command. This command would include all of the services, of course, but it should be commanded by the Air Force. The reasons are straightforward, and include present Air Force control of space surveillance, launch (including the shuttle) and other support resources, the USAF's historical role in space defense, and the likely continued blurring of technological boundaries between "air" and "space" media.

## CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, I have touched on three important aspects of the interservice coordination problem as it relates to planning for maritime conflicts. First, there are indeed important reasons why the Department of the Navy's planning process is substantially different from those of the other services. Second, when the services do collaborate on any level, the nature of that cooperation tends to follow a consistent pattern. Third, I have listed a few areas in which the modern military context has put growing pressure on traditional *ad hoc* joint arrangements. Finally, I have cited a few leading directions along

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<sup>43</sup> Thus, in 1978, the opportunity of acquiring a common 86 inch diameter MX-Trident II (D5) missile fell through.

which would-be joint planners might find productive interservice cooperation opportunities. Let us now consider the question posed in the Introduction, namely, whether we can go beyond specific and usually narrow program solutions and develop a coherent policy that better uses, *on a steady and predictable basis*, joint service capabilities.

The answer probably is no, with four important qualifications. Too often the failure of services to coordinate their efforts is blamed on parochialism, bureaucratic obstructionism, etc. In fact, there are fundamental reasons integral to the present organization of the U.S. national security establishment that explain why it is so hard to effect any major overhaul of the way in which constituent service activities are supposed to be blent into a truly unified whole. To change things would require major reforms in the unified command system and in the service departments. For the time being, these changes would presumably be politically impossible. The present U.S. military organizational system has evolved along consistent lines for fairly compelling reasons from the start.<sup>44</sup> It is unlikely that these patterns could be amended, short of an entire changeover to some entirely new military organizational structure. In general, perhaps it is wise to set our sights on somewhat lesser objectives in the interests of doing what we can to improve day to day joint management performance.

Nonetheless, a few areas for near-term joint cooperation initiatives do stand out. First, acquisition processes must be reformed. We are a rich country, it is true, but we can not afford to run as many production lines as we do. We have made substantial progress to this end over the years but much yet remains to be done.

Second, the roles, missions, and force structure of the U.S. Marine Corps need to be brought in line with those of the services with which it would find itself in general purpose force contingencies. Barring a major mobilization effort, in other words, we simply won't have enough forces to go around and so we will employ these forces as divisions and wings first, and Marines second, more or less the way we did in Vietnam.

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<sup>44</sup> For excellent accounts of the origins and nature of the U.S. defense organizational structure, see Charles J. Hitch, *Decision Making for Defense*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1965, and J. Stockfish, *Plowshares into Swords: Managing the U.S. Defense Establishment*, Mason and Lipscomb, New York, 1973, pp. 124-49.

In any case, restructuring of USMC tactical air and organic fire support organization seems to be a priority task.

Third, we need to do more to prepare for non-NATO contingencies that could erupt on short notice, involve the USSR or other powerful adversaries, and pose great strategic threats to the United States and its coalitions. Some leading scenarios feature conflicts in East Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Caribbean. In each case, it is possible to conjure up scenarios where a trial and error allocation of responsibilities *will not* produce sufficiently effective results on the very tight schedules we could face.

Fourth, we should make more consistent the various service assumptions about such vital scenario features as the duration and tempo of a war. In particular, our ability to deliver sustained support by sea to forward theaters *must* be enhanced, or all of the rapid deployment capability and all of the advanced weapons in our inventories will end up not counting for much.

Naturally, the exact forms better cooperation could take would depend on the many unpredictable political and strategic features of the contingencies we would use for planning. What must be resolved, of course, is just how much effort and money we should spend to hedge against each in a range of potential scenarios requiring a joint-service reaction. There are innumerable issues with which we must be concerned: however the four issues posed here would, within the bureaucratic, budgetary, and other constraints before us, represent good ones for a first cut effort to enhance our ability to respond most effectively and efficiently to maritime contingencies requiring multi-service participation.

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